How to Avert a Renewed Nuclear Arms Race — A Strategic Pause Could Buy Time

On Feb. 5 the New START treaty — the last remaining U.S.-Russia agreement limiting strategic nuclear arms — will expire, creating a risky gap in the frameworks that have helped restrain great-power nuclear competition.

With war still raging in Ukraine, increasing tensions over Taiwan, China expanding its nuclear forces, and Russia developing novel delivery systems (from an intercontinental nuclear torpedo to a nuclear-powered cruise missile), the risk of a costly three-way nuclear buildup has grown.

President Trump has an opening to forestall that outcome. Russian President Vladimir Putin has proposed that both countries remain within New START limits for at least one year if the other reciprocates, and that negotiations begin on the broader set of issues that shape nuclear risk.

Why a Temporary Pause Matters

Putin’s one-year offer is imperfect: it currently lacks on-site inspection provisions, and one year provides limited long-term predictability. U.S. intelligence can count Russian launchers reliably, but estimating deployed warhead totals is more difficult. China, meanwhile, remains unwilling to negotiate limits and still fields far fewer nuclear forces than the United States or Russia.

Even so, a temporary pause could buy the time needed to test whether there is sufficient shared interest and willingness to compromise to avoid a renewed arms race. Massive new spending on nuclear stockpiles would do little to improve the security of the United States, Russia, or China — and could make all three less stable.

Incentives and Constraints

Putin’s focus on a war-oriented defense economy and conventional capabilities — despite Russia’s far smaller economy relative to the U.S. — suggests he may have limited appetite for an unrestrained nuclear competition. China’s industrial capacity and growing economy give it more strategic options, but Beijing would also be disadvantaged if its buildup prompted a large American response and the erosion of existing restraints.

“There’s no reason for us to be building brand new nuclear weapons,” President Trump has said, noting that existing arsenals are already overwhelmingly destructive and arguing for exploring new denuclearization deals and redirecting spending to other priorities.

Complicating Factors

Negotiating limits among three nuclear powers will be harder than between two. Emerging non-nuclear capabilities — precision conventional weapons, hypersonic delivery systems, missile defenses, and advances in artificial intelligence — complicate strategic calculations. Russia’s past violations of some arms-control pacts and China’s lack of experience with limits and inspections add verification and trust challenges.

A Practical Proposal

The breathing room offered by a temporary agreement to remain within New START limits could be decisive. The article recommends that Washington accept Russia’s proposal for a “strategic pause” and seek to extend it to two or three years to allow substantive negotiations. At the same time, the U.S. should press for verification measures — including inspections or voluntary visits — once the treaty’s formal legal inspection regime lapses.

Even if diplomacy ultimately fails and the United States concludes a buildup is necessary, expanding forces takes time. A two- to three-year pause would therefore impose minimal strategic risk while preserving opportunities to negotiate a more durable and verifiable agreement that includes Russia and, if possible, China.

By announcing a temporary mutual restraint with Russia and launching trilateral talks, the U.S. could take a meaningful step toward lowering nuclear risks and testing whether a truly “better agreement” is attainable.

Matthew Bunn is the James R. Schlesinger Professor of the Practice of Energy, National Security, and Foreign Policy at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government.