What Would It Take for Nicolás Maduro to Relinquish Power? Experts Say the Bar Is Very High

With a $50 million bounty on his head, reports of CIA activity in Caracas and US forces gathering in the Caribbean, debate has intensified over Nicolás Maduro’s future. Commentators and political figures across the hemisphere are weighing whether he could be removed by external force, internal pressure or a negotiated exit.

Some prominent commentators have openly argued for removing Maduro from office by force. Others say a negotiated departure — one that guarantees legal protections and preserves a role for Chavismo — is the least destructive option. Colombia’s foreign minister, Rosa Yolanda Villavicencio Mapy, suggested a negotiated transition could be the "healthiest" outcome, though Bogotá later clarified it does not seek to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs.

Maduro has led Venezuela since 2013, when he succeeded Hugo Chávez. His declared victory in the 2024 presidential election was widely disputed by the opposition and not recognized by most Western governments. The United States has long accused him of criminal activity and recently designated a group allegedly linked to his inner circle, known as "el Cartel de los Soles," as a terrorist organization — a move that could, in theory, expand the legal rationale for US action.

Why Maduro is unlikely to step down voluntarily

Analysts who study Venezuela say Maduro and his inner circle are unlikely to relinquish power without strong assurances. Elias Ferrer, a Caracas-based risk consultant at Orinoco Research, argues they fear prosecution, imprisonment or extradition if they leave office without immunity.

"The US is one of the few countries in the world that, if you mess with them, they can chase you until the end of the world," Ferrer said. "They are facing a very real danger."

Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodríguez has publicly vowed that the government will not surrender, framing the moment as one of historical resistance rather than crisis.

David Smilde, a Venezuela specialist and professor at Tulane University, emphasizes the ideological commitment of Maduro’s circle to Chavismo. Beyond personal fears over safety and wealth, many see themselves as part of a long-term revolutionary project that has resisted outside pressure for decades.

"Any acceptable transition would likely need a path that preserves Chavismo as a viable political force and offers assurances against a post-transition purge," Smilde said. He warns that removing Maduro would not automatically dismantle the broader power structure that benefits many inside the state and military.

Possible exit routes — and their limits

Experts outline a few theoretical exit paths, each with major caveats:

• Negotiated transition: The most peaceful option would be negotiations that offer legal protections for Maduro and his allies, and guarantees for the continued political role of Chavismo. Achieving credible guarantees, however, would be difficult and politically contentious.
• Exile: Some analysts say exile — potentially in Russia or another allied country — could be an "off-ramp," but this would likely require pressure from within the political and military elite.
• Internal military or elite pressure: A palace coup or negotiated removal engineered by senior officers or powerbrokers is possible, but it depends on fracturing loyalties and enough incentives to persuade Maduro’s circle to abandon him.
• External intervention: Direct military action by the United States or a coalition remains a remote but talked-about possibility. It carries high legal, diplomatic and humanitarian risks and would likely deepen instability.

Brian Fonseca, a professor at Florida International University, stresses that internal pressure — particularly from the military — would probably be required to force a nonvoluntary exit. Ferrer, however, doubts Maduro’s inner circle would accept exile, arguing they prefer arrangements that allow them to retain economic power and influence over the armed forces.

Smilde recalls the aftermath of Hugo Chávez’s death in 2013, when many observers wrongly assumed Chavismo’s project had ended. Removing a single leader, he warns, does not automatically undo the entrenched networks that support a regime.

Whatever path unfolds, experts agree the obstacles are substantial: legal exposure, entrenched patronage networks, ideological commitment and the loyalty of parts of the security apparatus all make an easy resolution unlikely. Any transition that fails to address those structural issues risks perpetuating instability rather than resolving it.