The Atlantic reports that Abbas Kamel, head of Egypt’s General Intelligence Service, secretly visited Israel on September 26, 2023 — 11 days before the October 7 Hamas assault — and warned that Hamas appeared to be preparing a major attack. His chartered Cessna landed at Ben‑Gurion for about 67 minutes; flight logs and trackers corroborate the timing. Kamel urged steps to ease tensions in Gaza but provided no dates, targets, or operational specifics. Israeli, Egyptian and Western officials disagree over whether the warning reached Israel’s top leadership and what, if anything, could have been done.
Secret Visit: Egypt’s Intelligence Chief Warned Israel 11 Days Before Oct. 7 Hamas Assault

An investigation by The Atlantic reports that Abbas Kamel, then head of Egypt’s General Intelligence Service, made a clandestine trip to Israel on September 26, 2023 — just 11 days before the October 7 attack — to warn Israeli officials that Hamas appeared to be preparing a major operation.
According to the report, Kamel arrived at Ben‑Gurion Airport on a chartered Cessna linked to Egyptian intelligence. The aircraft used an isolated section of the airport reserved for sensitive diplomatic and security missions and remained on the ground for roughly 67 minutes before returning to Cairo. The timing is documented in Israel Airports Authority flight logs and corroborated by independent flight‑tracking services.
What Kamel Reportedly Warned
Israeli, Arab, American and European officials briefed after October 7 told The Atlantic that Kamel warned Hamas appeared to be preparing a significant, large‑scale attack and urged Israel to take economic steps to reduce tensions in the Gaza Strip. A former Israeli official characterized the message bluntly:
"If you don't change course, Gaza is going to explode in your face."
The visit reportedly did not include specific dates, named targets, or detailed operational intelligence. It remains unclear which Israeli officials Kamel met during the roughly hour‑long visit.
Conflicting Accounts And Continued Warnings
Officials from seven countries told The Atlantic that the personal, urgent nature of the visit should have alarmed Israel’s political and security leadership. "The messenger was the message," a former Israeli official said, arguing it would be unlikely for the head of Egyptian intelligence to visit without Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu being aware.
After October 7, the Prime Minister’s Office rejected reports that Egypt had warned Israel in advance, saying the prime minister had "not spoken or met with the head of Egyptian intelligence since the establishment of the government, neither directly nor indirectly." Tzachi Hanegbi, who served as head of Israel’s National Security Council at the time, also told The Atlantic that Kamel did not visit and no Egyptian warning was delivered.
However, multiple Israeli, Egyptian and American officials said Cairo continued to send warnings until October 5, 2023, including a message expressing urgency that the situation could not continue. Those messages likewise did not specify timing or methods.
Context And Uncertainties
The Atlantic notes that Kamel’s visit coincided with a Jerusalem ceremony marking the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War, which Prime Minister Netanyahu attended. In public remarks that day Netanyahu referenced the intelligence failures of 1973 and said Israel does not take threats lightly; his public schedule shows he later attended a classified briefing.
While the newly reported visit and warnings underline concerns that diplomatic intelligence channels were active before October 7, significant uncertainties remain: who met Kamel in Israel, what was communicated in closed meetings, and whether the warnings contained intelligence that could have altered preparations. The Atlantic’s investigation relies on flight logs, independent trackers and interviews with officials briefed after the attack.
Photo caption: A view of homes destroyed in the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack at Kibbutz Nir Oz near the Gaza border (credit: Tsafrir Abayov/Flash90).
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