Bamako on the Brink: How al‑Qaeda’s JNIM Is Choking Mali’s Capital

JNIM’s blockade has pushed Bamako to breaking point

A months‑long blockade by Jama’at Nusrat al‑Islam wal‑Muslimin (JNIM), the al‑Qaeda affiliate active across the Sahel, has brought Mali’s capital, Bamako, to a near standstill. By sealing major highways used by fuel tankers since September, the group has created an economic and energy chokehold that analysts say is intensifying pressure on Mali’s military government to consider negotiations — a step the junta has so far resisted.

What has happened in Bamako?

For weeks, most residents have been unable to buy fuel for cars or motorcycles, forcing long waits where supplies remain. Fuel prices in some places reportedly jumped from about $25 to $130 per litre, and the crisis has driven up transportation, food and other costs. Western countries, including the United States and United Kingdom, advised citizens to leave and evacuated non‑essential diplomatic staff. Schools across Mali closed until at least November 9 as staff struggled to commute, and power outages became more frequent.

Who is JNIM?

JNIM was formed in 2017 as a coalition of Algeria‑based al‑Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and several Malian armed groups — Ansar Dine, Al‑Murabitun and Katiba Macina — that emerged after the 2012 rebellion in northern Mali. The group’s stated aims are territorial control and the expulsion of Western influence. Estimates of its membership vary; some regional and Western officials have put the figure near 6,000 fighters.

Leadership and strategy

JNIM is led by Iyad Ag‑Ghali, a Tuareg from Kidal who previously founded Ansar Dine and has a long record in Mali’s rebellions and negotiations. U.S. intelligence and analysts say JNIM combines guerrilla attacks and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) with efforts to build local support through material aid and informal governance. In areas it controls, the group often imposes strict social rules and targets infrastructure such as schools, communication towers and bridges.

Tactics and humanitarian impact

The blockade on fuel supplies is part of a broader JNIM tactic of besieging towns and disrupting critical lifelines to exert pressure on the state. Human rights groups and conflict monitors accuse JNIM of repeated attacks on civilians and those perceived to assist government forces. ACLED recorded 207 deaths from JNIM activity in Mali between January and April of the reported year, while overall casualties linked to the group number in the thousands since 2017.

How the fuel crisis unfolded

The blockade intensified after Mali’s military government banned small‑scale rural fuel sales from July 1, aiming to limit black‑market trade that could benefit militant groups. In response, JNIM began blocking tankers into Bamako in September and reportedly set fire to scores of fuel trucks in southern and western Mali. The government reported that a convoy of about 300 tankers reached Bamako on October 7 and that another convoy of dozens arrived on October 30, but many other deliveries were ambushed or intercepted.

Territorial reach and revenue

JNIM operates across northern, central and western Mali, recruiting from marginalised groups including Tuareg, Arab, Fulani and Songhai communities, and also counts some members from the Bambara majority. The group controls or contests territory in many rural areas and occasionally seizes small towns such as Léré and Farabougou. It derives revenue from artisanal gold mining (Kayes region is a major gold hub), forced taxation, weapons smuggling and kidnappings for ransom. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime estimates the group profited from livestock sales and cattle rustling schemes in past years.

Regional expansion

JNIM has expanded into neighbouring countries. It allied with Burkina Faso’s Ansarul‑Islam in 2017 and now operates widely there, holding or contesting territory in many regions outside the capital. The group has launched cross‑border attacks into northern Ivory Coast, northern Togo and Benin, and in one recent incident it killed a Nigerian policeman on the Benin‑Nigeria border. Analysts warn JNIM is probing commercially active, under‑policed border areas where it could try to establish footholds.

International forces, mercenaries and the strategic test

After successive coups, Mali’s junta terminated cooperation with French forces (which left in 2022) and ended contracts with a UN peacekeeping force in 2023. Bamako has since relied on Russian mercenary forces—initially Wagner and more recently Kremlin‑linked Africa Corps units—to support counterinsurgency efforts. Results have been mixed: Russian contractors helped retake some territory but have also suffered heavy ambushes, and rights groups accuse them of abuses against civilians. The fuel blockade is forcing Malian forces to divert troops to protect convoys, limiting broader military operations against militants.

Negotiations or continued confrontation?

Analysts suggest JNIM may be using the blockade to provoke public anger and pressure the military government into concessions or political change. While Colonel Assimi Goita’s junta has historically rejected talks with the group, early October reports indicate the government quietly greenlit local mediator‑led negotiations in some areas. Local agreements have reportedly been signed in parts of Ségou, Mopti and Timbuktu in which communities accept JNIM rules and taxes in return for an end to sieges.

Outlook: The crisis highlights JNIM’s ability to disrupt urban life without mounting full urban assaults. In the medium term, analysts believe the junta may face tough choices between sustained military pressure and pragmatic, localized negotiations to restore essential services and stability.

Sources: Reporting and analysis from ACLED, Control Risks, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Critical Threats and human rights organisations as cited in the original dispatch.