Heglig Seized: How the RSF’s Capture Reshapes Sudan’s War, Finances and Geopolitics

The Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) capture of the Heglig oilfield marks a significant turning point in Sudan’s conflict. Heglig—the country’s most operational oil facility—now lies outside central government control, production has halted, and technical staff have evacuated toward neighbouring South Sudan. The loss deprives Khartoum of a major revenue stream and alters the balance between key armed actors.

Why Heglig Matters

Economic Impact: Heglig processes an estimated 80,000–100,000 barrels per day and sits on the pipeline to Port Sudan. Its seizure removes fees and transit revenues that sustained the central government’s finances, particularly those linked to South Sudanese oil exports.

Military and Political Significance: Heglig was the army’s last major strategic position in West/South Kordofan after the fall of el‑Fasher and Babnusa. The army’s withdrawal—even if framed as protecting facilities—signals a regional power shift in favour of the RSF and its allies.

Regional Ramifications: The site is part of a shared oil system with South Sudan and has long been a source of tension between Khartoum and Juba. RSF control complicates relations with South Sudan and raises the regional cost of the conflict.

Three Overlapping Effects

1. Stronger RSF Bargaining Power. Controlling Heglig gives the RSF economic and political leverage. RSF leader Hemedti (Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo) can claim not only territory but also possession of a strategic resource that can be used as a negotiating card.

2. Weakened Army Finances. The army has already lost access to much of Darfur’s and western Sudan’s gold. With Heglig gone, Khartoum’s options narrow to increased foreign support, limited remaining taxation, and transit fees—if those persist. Sustaining a long war of attrition will be more difficult.

3. A Potential New Frontline. Analysts suggest the RSF may press south and east from Heglig toward el‑Obeid–Kadugli–Dilling, aiming to encircle or strangle el‑Obeid. If true, Heglig could become the gateway to a broader south‑central confrontation.

Limits to RSF Gains

Control of Heglig is not the same as immediate oil production. Technical staff have been evacuated, and pipeline operations are complex. For now the site functions primarily as a disruptive pressure card rather than a steady revenue source for the RSF. The immediate effect is to deny Khartoum revenue rather than to transfer that income efficiently to RSF coffers.

Political Outlook

Despite mounting economic pressure, the government may not be ready to negotiate. Military leaders in Port Sudan argue that early concessions would reward a rebel force and could threaten the army’s institutional future. The government therefore appears willing to continue fighting while seeking greater foreign backing—particularly from regional actors such as Egypt—and security assistance from external powers.

The RSF, meanwhile, expects territorial control and resource access to force international capitals to engage with it as a de facto power. But territory and resources alone may not prompt an immediate peace: sustained battlefield gains plus intensified external pressure would likely be required to bring both sides seriously to the table.

Broader Trends: Fragmentation And The War Economy

The capture of Heglig highlights the emergence of a war economy in Sudan. The RSF controls gold and informal trade routes and is extending into oil; the army dominates ports and taxes in the east and north; other armed groups control local resources. This fragmentation turns natural wealth into bargaining chips, fueling cycles of conflict and eroding the central state.

Even if a ceasefire or political deal is brokered, persistent armed‑economic networks could enable recurring violence unless peace efforts address resource governance through dismantling, regulation and economic restructuring.

Geopolitics And External Stakes

The Heglig episode also feeds wider international concerns. Media reports have claimed Port Sudan authorities offered Russia a long‑term naval access deal and mining concessions; Washington has publicly warned about a Russian military foothold on the Red Sea. Some US officials—including Senator Marco Rubio—have signalled heightened American interest in preventing broader strategic realignments in the region. These developments increase the international stakes around Sudan’s internal conflict.

Conclusion

The RSF’s seizure of Heglig deepens Khartoum’s economic squeeze and strengthens the RSF’s leverage, but it does not, on its own, guarantee a swift negotiated settlement. Instead, Heglig accelerates a process of attrition and territorial fragmentation that will likely make regional and international actors more insistent on talks. Any durable peace must confront the underlying war economy and include broad internal political participation beyond negotiations between military leaders.