The Nairobi nine-point roadmap, unveiled on December 16, positions civilians as a "third pole" between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces and echoes Quad calls for a three-month truce, humanitarian access, and the exclusion of Bashir-era figures. Critics say it lacks concrete security-sector reforms and broad grassroots endorsement, with resistance committees not formally signing. EU officials and analysts warn the initiative risks reproducing elite-driven politics and may be designed to attract international support rather than to build domestic consensus. Observers also caution that linking ceasefire talks to political reforms prematurely could undermine durable transition prospects.
Sudan’s Nairobi Roadmap: Civilian 'Third Pole' — Breakthrough or Window Dressing?
Former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, left, and Abdelwahid al-Nur met in 2019 in Khartoum [File: Embassy of France in Sudan/Facebook]
On December 16, a coalition of Sudanese political parties, armed movements, civil society organisations and prominent political figures unveiled a nine-point political roadmap in Nairobi, framing the document as a civilian-led effort to end Sudan’s war and restore a democratic transition.
What the Roadmap Claims
Framed as an anti-war, pro-peace platform, the declaration seeks to position civilians as a distinct “third pole” between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Its language echoes earlier international demands — notably the Quad’s September statement — calling for a three-month truce, expanded humanitarian access, the exclusion of figures tied to the Omar al-Bashir era, and security-sector reform under civilian oversight. The declaration, however, does not set out detailed, actionable steps for military or security reform.
Who Signed — And Who Didn’t
Signatories included the National Umma Party, the Sudanese Congress Party, civic groups such as the Darfur Lawyers Association and the Coordination of Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM-AW) led by Abdelwahid al-Nur, and former prime minister Abdalla Hamdok. Al-Nur’s endorsement — given his long-standing opposition to elite-driven deals and his control in parts of Jebel Marra — was hailed by some as significant. Yet resistance committees, the grassroots neighbourhood networks central to Sudan’s 2019 uprising, did not formally sign or endorse the Nairobi declaration.
Critiques And Concerns
Sudanese analysts and international observers raised immediate concerns about representation and motive. Researcher Hamid Khalafallah argued the coalition reproduces earlier elite-driven formations that struggled to connect with ordinary Sudanese, particularly communities hardest hit by the fighting. Drafts were reportedly shared with some grassroots groups, but the process advanced without broad, collective deliberation — reinforcing fears that civilians on the ground remain politically instrumentalised rather than empowered.
"It’s in many ways a reproduction of former groups that have … struggled to represent the Sudanese people," Khalafallah told Al Jazeera.
US-Africa policy expert Cameron Hudson cautioned that the Nairobi declaration appears closely modelled on the Quad’s statement and may have been calibrated to attract international backing rather than to build genuine domestic consensus. He warned that conflating ceasefire negotiations with political and army reforms risks premature sequencing that could hinder a durable transition.
International Response
Several European officials publicly distanced themselves from the Nairobi initiative. A senior European Union diplomat told Al Jazeera that Brussels does not view the roadmap as the basis for a unified civilian process and stressed preference for a single, AU-led civilian framework. The EU has emphasised creating an inclusive, credible civilian alternative to both SAF and RSF, and has warned that multiplying civilian platforms risks fragmentation and could inadvertently legitimise military rule.
The diplomat also criticised the conduct of the warring parties, citing a recent oil-facility agreement around Heglig — brokered under South Sudanese mediation — as an example of priorities focused on resources rather than civilians.
Why This Matters
The Nairobi roadmap highlights a central dilemma in international and domestic efforts to end Sudan’s conflict: outsiders and some civilian leaders demand the exclusion of the SAF and RSF from future politics, yet both armed actors remain essential parties to any ceasefire or political settlement. That contradiction complicates mediation strategies and raises questions about sequencing — whether ceasefire deals should be pursued independently of long-term security-sector reform and political negotiations.
Whether the Nairobi declaration marks a genuine civilian breakthrough or another elite-led initiative seeking international legitimacy remains uncertain. Its impact will depend on whether it can broaden grassroots buy-in, present concrete security reforms, and construct a unified civilian platform accepted by Sudanese society and international mediators.
