Why U.S. Pressure Won’t Trigger Another Venezuelan Exodus — Maduro’s Grip Will

Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado was awarded the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize, a powerful emblem of the country’s democratic struggle. She left Venezuela with assistance from the U.S. government after spending more than a year in hiding to avoid persecution by the Maduro regime and was able to travel to Oslo to join the celebrations.

On the same day, tensions between Washington and Caracas rose after U.S. authorities seized a Venezuelan oil tanker, and U.S. forces maintained a visible presence in the Caribbean. Some analysts warned that this mixture of diplomatic, economic and military pressure could further destabilize an already fragile state and prompt a fresh wave of migration.

Pressure Isn’t the Primary Driver

That argument sounds plausible at first glance, but it does not hold up to the evidence. Sanctions did not create Venezuela’s migration crisis, and heightened U.S. deterrence is unlikely to make it worse. The single variable that consistently increases departures is the same factor that keeps Venezuela mired in authoritarian stagnation: Nicolás Maduro remaining in power.

Migration has followed the decline of state capacity and economic collapse — not shifts in U.S. policy.

I write as someone who has spent years rigorously studying Venezuelan migration and speaking directly with people who fled. Their accounts match the empirical record: people are escaping a failing state. To grasp the magnitude of the tragedy, it helps to remember that for most of the 20th century Venezuela was a destination for immigrants seeking opportunity and stability. That a country with that history has become one of the largest exporters of migrants in the region is the starkest sign of internal collapse.

Evidence That Collapse Predated Sanctions

That collapse began well before the first round of broad financial sanctions. In a 2019 Brookings study I co-authored, we showed that by 2016 — a full year before certain financial sanctions were imposed — Venezuela’s food imports had fallen by more than 70 percent from their peak. Imports of medicine and medical equipment had plunged, and infant mortality rose sharply even as it declined elsewhere in Latin America. Measured in calories, the purchasing power of the minimum wage had dropped roughly 92 percent from 2010 by the time sanctions were introduced.

The conclusion is unavoidable: Venezuela’s largest economic and social free fall occurred before sanctions. These outcomes arose from internal causes — mismanagement, expropriations, corruption and the hollowing out of state capacity — not from Washington. By 2018, the exodus was already well underway, with nearly 2 million Venezuelans having left the country.

When the Regime Strengthens, Migration Rises

A second test reinforces this interpretation. If U.S. pressure were the main driver of migration, flows should have eased when Washington softened its posture. Yet during the Biden administration — when U.S. officials pursued negotiations with elements of the regime, granted certain sanction waivers to companies like Chevron, and avoided broad escalation — arrivals of Venezuelans at the U.S. southern border reached record highs. In 2023 more than 335,000 Venezuelans crossed, exceeding totals from the previous decade.

A study I conducted using monthly data from 2020 to 2024 helps explain why: departures rose when oil revenue increased. Higher oil income strengthens Maduro’s capacity to repress dissent, expand patronage networks and signal that political change is unlikely. For ordinary Venezuelans, a stronger regime reduces hope and increases the incentive to flee.

These findings align with conversations I’ve had along the Colombian border in Cúcuta and across South America. Venezuelans repeatedly cite the same reasons for leaving: the impossibility of securing a stable income, the collapse of basic services, insecurity, and the conviction that life will not improve under continued authoritarian rule — motivations that persist regardless of shifts in U.S. policy.

Policy Implications: Protect People, Not Only Pressure Regimes

That is also why the recent U.S. decision to end Temporary Protected Status for Venezuelans is a serious policy error. It is inconsistent to condemn the Maduro regime’s abuses while removing legal protections from those fleeing it. Until Maduro leaves power and Venezuelans regain their rights, rescinding TPS will only exacerbate migrants’ suffering and push many into informal, often dangerous, work. That outcome harms vulnerable people and robs host countries of potential taxpayers and workers at a time when labor is needed.

Sound policy begins with an accurate diagnosis. Misreading the drivers of Venezuelan migration leads to ineffective responses. Flows will not meaningfully slow until Venezuela restores economic stability, rebuilds institutions, and returns basic rights. Venezuelans made a clear demand for change in the disputed July 2024 elections, which opposition leaders said they won; the Maduro government refused to recognize those results and retained power through repression.

The Venezuelan exodus is a reaction to domestic collapse and authoritarian entrenchment, not primarily to external pressure. As Washington and other governments consider next steps in the region, they should start from that reality so policymakers can design responses that are effective, principled, and grounded in evidence.

Dany Bahar, Ph.D. is an associate professor at Brown University and a senior fellow at the Harvard Growth Lab.