How Germany’s Far-Right AfD Is Courting The Voters It Says It Will Deport

On September 6 the far‑right Alternative for Germany (AfD) won a landslide in Saxony‑Anhalt, taking 43.8% of the vote — more than double the Christian Democratic Union's (CDU) 17.2% — with a record turnout of 77.8%. The party ran on a platform that emphasised a deportation and "remigration" offensive and pledged to pursue "all legal avenues" to limit visible Islamic expression.

Saxony‑Anhalt is largely rural, with a small migrant population, so the AfD’s breakthrough there owed relatively little to immigrant voters. Yet the party faces a different test in Berlin, where an opinion poll published on September 10 put the AfD at about 18% — roughly double its 2023 share of 9.1% — in a city where 42.3% of residents have a migration background. In a close race, migrant‑background voters could be decisive.

Targeting Long‑Settled Communities

For years the AfD has sought to reach long‑settled immigrant communities with foreign‑language outreach — including Turkish‑language materials and TikTok content aimed at people of Russian and Turkish origin. Many of these groups are long‑standing German citizens with voting rights. The AfD’s pitch to them is often framed as reassurance: established communities are "not the problem," the party suggests, while newer arrivals are.

But outreach has not translated into broad support. A July 2026 panel study by the German Center for Integration and Migration Research (DeZIM) found voters with a migration background rated the AfD the least electable party. Another DeZIM report documents falling turnout among voters with Turkish, Middle Eastern and North African roots, warning of possible longer‑term disengagement from the party system.

Which Migrant Votes Matter — And Why

A 2025 nationwide study of migrant voting preferences placed the AfD at around 19% overall, third behind the CDU and SPD. The party does perform better among certain groups — notably voters of Polish origin and ethnic German resettlers — but it has not broadly penetrated the Turkish‑German communities it is courting before Berlin’s vote.

DeZIM researchers describe a dynamic of "competition for recognition": groups treated as second‑order citizens end up in rivalry with one another rather than joining forces to challenge the hierarchies that disadvantage them. Political scientist Özgür Özvatan has traced how social and economic advancement for Turkish‑German communities does not always translate into lasting social acceptance.

From Descent To Conduct: A New Far‑Right Playbook

A deeper shift underpins these dynamics across Europe. The older far right defined belonging by descent, creating an exclusionary ceiling: migrants were outsiders by definition. Since roughly 2015, many far‑right parties have adopted a different model that conditions belonging on behaviour and conformity. The message now is: assimilate, obey social norms and you may be accepted — regardless of origin.

Comparative examples illustrate the approach. Mayotte — an overseas French territory that is about 95% Muslim — gave Marine Le Pen her best national first‑round vote share in 2022. Researchers argue the Rassemblement National tailored its message there to target migrants from nearby Comoros rather than attacking Islam itself. Spain’s Vox has distinguished between Latin American migrants (portrayed as culturally closer) and migrants from Islamic countries, promoting an "Iberosfera" project to attract Hispanic voters.

Sweden has translated the conduct‑based idea into law. The Swedish Aliens Act, effective July 13, 2026, allows the Migration Agency to refuse or revoke residence permits for "deficient conduct" — behaviour that may not be criminal but is judged contrary to societal norms. Legal scholars warn the standard is vague and risks arbitrary application.

Limits And Risks Of Conditional Belonging

Conditioning belonging on conduct can broaden a party’s appeal temporarily, but it is fragile. When core bases radicalise, those who were once welcomed can be reclassified as outsiders. Spain’s experience shows how such tactics can provoke internal party rifts; Vox removed a pro‑Latino recruitment campaign after divisions over the approach.

The AfD retains similar manoeuvring room. Its Saxony‑Anhalt programme foregrounds "remigration," but the party insists this means only the lawful return of foreigners with no right to remain and rejects deporting German citizens with migration backgrounds as unconstitutional. Constitutional lawyers, however, read the Saxony‑Anhalt text as implying an expulsions policy rooted in an ethnic idea of the nation. The party has not clearly told voters which definition will prevail.

When Berlin votes, some migrant‑background residents may decide the AfD’s threats are not aimed at them personally. Producing that impression — and forcing some voters to choose whether the threat applies — is central to the AfD’s strategy.

Implication: The shifting far‑right tactic of conditional belonging can win short‑term support among select migrant groups, but it risks deepening social divisions and legal ambiguities while providing limited, unstable electoral gains.