The Quad — composed of the U.S., Japan, India and Australia — was created to uphold a rules‑based Indo‑Pacific. Although it became central to U.S. strategy after its revival, recent U.S. economic and policy decisions have strained allied trust and reduced the Quad's strategic relevance. India faces higher U.S. tariffs than China in some sectors, and large investment demands have strained Japan. Restoring the Quad requires aligning trade and investment policy with long‑term geopolitical priorities and treating partners as strategic equals.
The Quad at a Crossroads: How U.S. Policy Risks Eroding an Indo‑Pacific Bulwark
The Quad — an informal strategic partnership of the United States, Japan, India and Australia — was formed to sustain a "free and open Indo‑Pacific," a vision advanced by the late Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe in 2016 and later elevated in U.S. strategy. Its purpose: preserve a rules‑based order in the region that will shape the next global balance of power.
From Revival to Drift
At its revival, the Quad was positioned as a central pillar of Washington's Indo‑Pacific approach. Successive U.S. administrations have agreed on one central point: the Indo‑Pacific is the world's economic and geostrategic center of gravity, and China — more than Russia — presents the defining long‑term challenge to U.S. influence in the region.
But today, even as Beijing expands its coercive capabilities, the Quad risks sliding into strategic irrelevance. This deterioration stems less from outside pressure than from policy choices by Washington that have weakened allied trust, diverted attention and muddled priorities.
Where U.S. Policy Has Undermined Cohesion
Political attention and resources devoted to crises in Europe and the Middle East have constrained a full‑spectrum Indo‑Pacific pivot. More damaging, however, are recent economic tactics: the use of tariffs, trade leverage and investment conditionality in ways that have alienated essential partners.
Two illustrative outcomes are particularly troubling. First, India — repeatedly described by U.S. policymakers as a vital counterweight to China — now faces higher U.S. tariffs in some categories than China does, an outcome that undermines bilateral goodwill. Second, reporting suggests Tokyo was pressured into a very large investment pledge to support projects tied to U.S. priorities on terms that many in Japan view as disproportionately favorable to U.S. interests. Senior U.S. trade and commerce officials have acknowledged the strains these demands place on partners.
Treating allies as revenue sources or transactional bargaining chips may produce short‑term gains, but it corrodes strategic trust and the long‑term collective will needed to balance an increasingly assertive China.
Why India and Japan Matter
Japan and India occupy opposite flanks of China's maritime and continental approaches. Deepening partnerships with both countries is not optional; it is indispensable to sustaining a favorable balance of power in the Indo‑Pacific. India brings demographic scale, geographic depth and growing military capability. Japan contributes economic heft, technological edge and a forward naval posture.
When the Quad falters, the risk is not only diplomatic embarrassment but a tangible weakening of the coalition that could deter coercion and preserve open sea lanes, supply chains and norms.
Signs of Waning Priority
The Quad's reduced prominence is visible in recent policy documents and diplomatic signals: a near‑minimal mention in the latest U.S. National Security Strategy and the cancellation of high‑profile summit plans after trade disputes strained relations with New Delhi. Such developments suggest the Quad is being treated as expendable rather than central.
Core Purpose: The Quad was designed to be more than a talk shop. Its essential function is to act as a strategic bulwark against coercive revisionism and to sustain a stable regional balance of power.
A Course Correction Is Still Possible
Reviving Quad momentum will require aligning U.S. economic policy with long‑term geopolitical goals. Washington should prioritize partnership over short‑term extraction, consult allies before imposing disruptive measures, and restore the Quad to the heart of its Indo‑Pacific strategy.
If the United States fails to adjust course, the Quad's decline will deepen — weakening the collective capacity to check expansionist moves and to preserve a rules‑based regional order in the 21st century.
About the Author: Brahma Chellaney is the author of nine books, including the award‑winning Water: Asia's New Battleground.
