Key point: Pakistan’s defence minister has publicly accused India of influencing the Afghan Taliban after ceasefire talks with Afghanistan broke down, though no public evidence has been produced. India’s humanitarian aid, reopening of its Kabul embassy and senior Taliban visits to New Delhi have intensified Pakistani unease. Analysts say Islamabad’s narrative risks conflating separate threats — the TTP and Baloch separatists — into a single India‑centric storyline, increasing the danger of further escalation across already tense borders.
Why Pakistan Is Pointing the Finger at India Over the Taliban — Stakes, Claims and Regional Risks
Key point: Pakistan’s defence minister has publicly accused India of influencing the Afghan Taliban after ceasefire talks with Afghanistan broke down, though no public evidence has been produced. India’s humanitarian aid, reopening of its Kabul embassy and senior Taliban visits to New Delhi have intensified Pakistani unease. Analysts say Islamabad’s narrative risks conflating separate threats — the TTP and Baloch separatists — into a single India‑centric storyline, increasing the danger of further escalation across already tense borders.

Why Pakistan Is Pointing the Finger at India
On October 28, after Pakistani and Afghan negotiators failed to agree on an extension of a fragile ceasefire following deadly border clashes, Pakistan’s defence minister, Khawaja Asif, publicly accused a third country that was not at the negotiating table: India. In a television interview he charged that New Delhi had “penetrated” the Afghan Taliban leadership and was exacerbating tensions between Islamabad and Kabul.
Asif praised the Taliban delegates in talks held in Istanbul but described the wider process as a “puppet show” driven by forces in Kabul that he said were “controlled by Delhi.” He further alleged that India was pursuing a “low‑intensity war” against Pakistan via Afghanistan. The defence minister provided no public evidence to substantiate the claim that India was propping up the Taliban or supporting anti‑Pakistan groups.
What Islamabad Says and What It Means
Pakistan has repeatedly accused the Taliban of allowing anti‑Pakistan militants such as the Tehreek‑e‑Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to operate from Afghan soil. Islamabad has also long alleged Indian support for unrest inside Pakistan — including in Balochistan — though public evidence tying New Delhi to the TTP remains absent. Analysts view the growing public narrative that links India and the Taliban as reflecting deep strategic anxiety in Pakistan over New Delhi’s expanding diplomatic footprint in Kabul.
“India wants to engage in a low‑intensity war with Pakistan. To achieve this, they are using Kabul,” — Khawaja Asif (television interview)
Recent Signals from New Delhi and Kabul
India’s increased engagements with the Taliban have been visible: Afghan Taliban foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi made a six‑day visit to New Delhi — the first senior Taliban visit since the group took power again in 2021 — and India recently reopened its embassy in Kabul. When a magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck northern Afghanistan, India quickly offered assistance; External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar phoned Muttaqi and New Delhi dispatched 15 tonnes of food to Balkh and Samangan provinces.
New Delhi has described its approach as cautious and pragmatic, emphasizing humanitarian aid and support for Afghan development while insisting it respects Afghanistan’s sovereignty. India’s officials have denied any role in stoking violence inside Pakistan.
Analysts’ Perspectives and the Broader Context
Experts say Islamabad’s framing of the crisis often merges distinct threats — the TTP, secular Baloch separatists and Indian influence — into a single narrative that points to an external adversary. Ibraheem Bahiss of the International Crisis Group notes that while the TTP has ideological and social links to the Afghan Taliban, Baloch groups have a largely secular orientation, making the claim that India and the Taliban are jointly backing both groups difficult to reconcile.
Former Pakistani diplomat Asif Durrani and other Pakistani officials have alleged past Indian assistance to some Baloch leaders and suggested New Delhi may now be better positioned to operate in Afghanistan as ties with the Taliban improve. Still, Pakistan has not publicly produced conclusive evidence tying India to the TTP or other militant groups.
Why This Matters
The accusations come amid real tensions: cross‑border clashes earlier in the year, a fragile ceasefire mediated by Qatar and Türkiye, and an acrimonious relationship between Islamabad and New Delhi that flared into exchanges of strikes and warnings in May. Both sides have since traded tough rhetoric. India’s defence minister warned in October of stern responses to aggression near the disputed Sir Creek area, while Pakistan’s army chief warned that the onus of any escalation would lie with India.
Analysts warn the public politicization of India’s ties with the Taliban could further inflame regional mistrust and make de‑escalation harder to achieve. Without verifiable evidence to support Islamabad’s allegations, the narrative risks conflating separate security challenges and raising the chances of diplomatic or military miscalculation.
Outlook
As negotiators prepare for further mediated talks, the spotlight on India —whether justified or not— has become a central element in how Pakistan explains its rows with Kabul. The immediate risks are heightened diplomatic friction and the potential for renewed clashes along the border, while the longer‑term consequence may be an entrenched security posture in which each country views Afghanistan through the prism of rivalry rather than common regional stability.
