Former NASA Chief: U.S. Should Restart Artemis Moon Plan or Risk Losing Lunar Leadership to China

Former NASA Administrator Michael Griffin Urges Overhaul Of Artemis After Congressional Testimony

Former NASA administrator Michael Griffin delivered blunt criticism of the Artemis lunar program in testimony before the U.S. House Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee in Washington, D.C., on Dec. 4. The hearing, titled "Strategic Trajectories: Assessing China’s Space Rise and the Risks to U.S. Leadership," examined China's accelerating space efforts and what they mean for America’s position in space exploration.

Griffin argued that policy choices have left NASA committed to an Artemis architecture he says "cannot work." He contrasted that approach with China’s methodical program: "Sticking to a plan is important when the plan makes sense. China is sticking to a plan that makes sense. It looks a lot, in fact, like what the United States did for Apollo. We have stuck to a plan that does not make sense."

"We should start over, proceeding with all deliberate speed," Griffin told lawmakers. "We have lost a lot of time, and we may not be able to return to the moon before the Chinese execute their own first landing. Or we may; space is hard and mission success is guaranteed to no one. But though we may not win at this first step, we cannot cede the pursuit and leave the playing field to others."

Technical and Programmatic Concerns

Central to Griffin’s criticism is the Artemis moon-landing architecture that depends on in-orbit refueling of a lunar lander by multiple SpaceX Starship launches. That approach requires an uncertain and potentially high number of Starship flights to top off propellant—SpaceX has estimated it could take as many as 12 launches to fully refuel the lander. The refueling concept remains unproven: SpaceX plans to test Starship’s in-flight refueling on a forthcoming mission, but it has not yet been demonstrated in operational conditions.

Griffin warned that the long dwell time the lander would face in orbit while refueling sorties launch and rendezvous would likely cause propellant to boil off before the mission could proceed, creating what he called an unacceptable crew risk. "I do not see a way with the current technology we have to overcome those problems, and therefore we should not pursue that line of approach," he said, reiterating his recommendation that NASA cancel Artemis 3 and other pending Artemis missions to rethink the overall architecture.

Timeline Uncertainty And Competitive Risk

Internal documents cited at the hearing indicate timeline uncertainty: SpaceX estimates obtained by Politico put the earliest possible crewed lunar landing attempt at September 2028, while NASA publicly continues to target 2027 for Artemis 3. If the first crewed attempt slips into late 2028, the spacing between the first three Artemis missions would average roughly two years—far slower than the cadence of Apollo missions in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Acting NASA administrator Sean Duffy has publicly said SpaceX is "behind" on Starship and lander development and indicated the White House and NASA may open the lunar lander contract to other competitors such as Blue Origin.

Broader Instability At NASA

Witnesses at the hearing also pointed to broader agency instability: recent budget pressures and workforce changes have strained facilities, placed flagship science missions at risk, and reduced staff levels—factors that can hinder long-term program continuity.

Strategic Stakes

Beyond technology and schedules, Griffin emphasized the strategic significance of a sustained lunar presence. Whichever nation establishes a long-term foothold on the moon first could influence rules and norms for how lunar resources and regions are accessed and used. "I am confident that China fully understands this," Griffin said.

Key witnesses at the hearing, including Dean Cheng of the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, argued that China’s political and bureaucratic systems enable decades-long programmatic stability—an advantage the U.S. may lack under current practices.

Note: This article summarizes testimony and documents discussed at the Dec. 4 hearing. Timelines and technical assessments reflect statements made by witnesses and reports cited during that session.