The Coalition of the Willing, launched after a London summit on 2 March 2025, aims to create a Multinational Force–Ukraine to provide security guarantees for any peace settlement. The initiative now lists 34 participants and proposes a headquarters at Fort Mont-Valérien with a forward command in Kyiv, but key issues remain unsettled. Moscow rejects NATO troops in Ukraine and U.S. support is ambiguous, leaving the Coalition reliant on American ISTAR and logistics to be operationally credible. Without a clear peace agreement, Russian acquiescence and substantial U.S. backing, the plan risks being largely symbolic.
Is the 'Coalition of the Willing' a Real European Security Tool — or a Pipe Dream?
One recurring element in attempts to negotiate a peaceful end to the war in Ukraine has been the high-profile “Coalition of the Willing.” Launched by UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer after a London summit on 2 March 2025, the initiative aims to create a multinational force to offer Ukraine security guarantees as part of any settlement with Russia.
What Is Proposed
Proposals range from a so-called reassurance force stationed inside Ukraine to deter or prevent violations of a peace deal, to a deterrent strike capability able to respond to breaches. The Coalition — also called the Coalition des Volontaires — now lists 34 participants: 28 NATO members (all except the United States, Hungary, North Macedonia and Slovakia) alongside Australia, Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Japan and New Zealand.
Organizers have set out a framework for a Multinational Force–Ukraine (MNF–U), with a three-star headquarters at Fort Mont-Valérien near Paris and a two-star forward command led by a British officer in Kyiv. The plan envisages initial French command and a later rotation to British leadership and a London base after about a year.
Fundamental Questions Remain
Despite detailed planning, the Coalition has sometimes felt like an exercise in momentum rather than in contingency planning. The most basic question is: what precisely would the force do? Terms such as “implementation,” “reassurance” and “deterrent” primarily apply after a peace settlement. But more than nine months after the initiative launched, Kyiv and Moscow have not agreed even sketch terms for ceasing hostilities. Without a peace agreement, it is impossible to define the force’s rules, mission set or metrics for success.
“A European-led ‘multinational force Ukraine’ made up from contributions from willing nations within the framework of the Coalition of the Willing and supported by the US. It will assist in the regeneration of Ukraine’s forces, in securing Ukraine’s skies, and in supporting safer seas, including through operating inside Ukraine.”
The Dec. 15 joint statement by a group of European states and the EU sets out ambitions, but key practical and political obstacles persist.
Moscow’s Red Lines
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov has reiterated the Kremlin’s longstanding position that NATO troops on Ukrainian soil are unacceptable. Some U.S. officials have privately suggested Moscow might accept non-NATO European forces, but that expectation appears optimistic given Russia’s current posture. Excluding NATO insignia may not be sufficient to overcome Moscow’s objections.
Where Will the Capabilities Come From?
A credible MNF–U would likely need hard capabilities beyond what most European states can provide alone. The joint statement describes the force as “supported by the US,” but what that support entails is unclear. In April, President Trump publicly ruled out U.S. military support to the Coalition; in August he referenced possible “security guarantees” without specifying what that would mean in practice. The deployment of U.S. ground forces is not being contemplated.
If the MNF–U is to be more than a symbolic presence it would require U.S. ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance) assets — from Space Delta 7 satellite support to RC-135 Rivet Joint and E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft, and high-end unmanned aerial systems like the RQ-170 Sentinel and RQ-4 Global Hawk. NATO does not currently possess comparable coverage. Logistics, particularly air-to-air refuelling, are another critical gap: NATO’s central Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport fleet numbers around nine tankers versus the U.S. inventory of several hundred.
Conclusion
The Coalition of the Willing and its planned MNF–U are exercises in contingency: should there be a verifiable peace agreement to monitor or enforce, should Russia tolerate non-NATO European forces on Ukrainian territory, and should the United States supply significant enabling capabilities, then the March 2025 initiative by Starmer and Macron could be a meaningful diplomatic achievement. Without those preconditions, however, the project risks remaining largely symbolic — a reassuring narrative of European resolve that may not translate into an operational deterrent.
Eliot Wilson is a writer and historian, a senior fellow for national security at the Coalition for Global Prosperity and a contributing editor for Defence on the Brink.
