Overview: In his second term President Trump has pursued a more radical but politically durable “America First” foreign policy that pressures allies for economic gains and deprioritizes strategic competition with rivals. Despite early market turmoil, the economy has shown resilience (the S&P 500 is up ~37% since April 8, and the Atlanta Fed estimates growth near 4%), while average U.S. tariffs rose from ~2.3% to ~17.9%. Allies have accommodated demands and increased defense pledges, but critics warn that short-term success can mask long-term damage to alliances, supply chains, and U.S. competitiveness with China.
What If 'America First' Seems to Be Working? Short-Term Gains, Long-Term Risks
Overview: In his second term President Trump has pursued a more radical but politically durable “America First” foreign policy that pressures allies for economic gains and deprioritizes strategic competition with rivals. Despite early market turmoil, the economy has shown resilience (the S&P 500 is up ~37% since April 8, and the Atlanta Fed estimates growth near 4%), while average U.S. tariffs rose from ~2.3% to ~17.9%. Allies have accommodated demands and increased defense pledges, but critics warn that short-term success can mask long-term damage to alliances, supply chains, and U.S. competitiveness with China.
12:45 AM, 11/19/2025Politics
What If 'America First' Seems to Be Working?
In his second term, President Donald Trump has pushed a far more radical — and politically resilient — foreign policy than in his first. The informal restraint of senior Cabinet figures, the so-called “axis of adults,” has largely disappeared. In its place is a coherent, transactional strategy that squeezes allies for economic advantage while de-emphasizing long-term strategic competition with rivals.
A new posture: transactional, nationalistic, and durable — for now
Republicans who favor international engagement and Democrats alike warn of lasting damage to alliances and U.S. competitiveness with China. Yet the immediate fallout has been surprisingly muted. After the “Liberation Day” tariffs triggered a sharp market reaction and bond-market stress, seven months on the broader economic picture looks less catastrophic than many feared: the S&P 500 is roughly 37% higher since April 8, and the Atlanta Federal Reserve estimates annual growth near 4%.
Still, the underlying shift is dramatic. Trump has elevated the average U.S. tariff rate from about 2.3% at the start of his term to roughly 17.9%. Aside from China, many countries have limited their retaliation — apparently concerned that the U.S. can escalate further. Some European allies also accept uncomfortable terms rather than risk losing U.S. support for Ukraine.
Deals, defense spending, and coerced cooperation
The administration has used leverage to extract lopsided economic arrangements from allies: for example, Japan has agreed to channel large investments into the U.S. economy under terms that heavily favor American returns, and a comparable deal has been negotiated with South Korea. At the same time, allies have pledged higher defense spending (many NATO members have committed to around 3.5% of GDP on defense and 1.5% on defense-related infrastructure), in part because they take seriously the threat that U.S. security guarantees could be withdrawn.
“Bullying works,” critics say — allies comply, make concessions, and sometimes even invest more in defense.
Rivals, restraint, and a shifting bipartisan consensus
On rivals, the administration has sought closer ties with Russia, with mixed results, while downplaying strategic confrontation with China: some China hawks have been sidelined and certain export controls on AI-related semiconductor chips have been loosened. President Trump at times has signaled interest in a U.S.-China “G2” dynamic. The result: a fraying of the once-broad congressional consensus on a tough posture toward Beijing.
That shift carries risks. China could respond economically or militarily; cyber intrusions attributed to Chinese, Russian, and North Korean actors threaten critical U.S. infrastructure; and a disruption to Taiwan — a linchpin of advanced semiconductor supply — would have severe global consequences. Yet these costs can take time to appear, which makes the “America First” playbook politically durable if the short-term costs remain muted.
The strategic choice: team captain or lone wolf?
The central question for Americans is whether to be the leader of a cooperative international team — working with the European Union, Japan, India, South Korea, Australia and others to defend shared interests — or to act as a predatory lone wolf that extracts short-term gains and depletes long-term influence.
Trump and some allies explicitly favor the latter. Their case is that squeezing partners and striking transactional deals yields immediate returns. The counterargument is that alliances and institutions are force multipliers: combined, like-minded states are better positioned to secure critical minerals and supply chains, defend technological advantage, deter aggression, and protect global stability.
What opponents must do
Opponents of “America First” cannot rely solely on predicting immediate calamity. If short-term costs remain muted, they must make a clear, persuasive case about the long-term consequences: the erosion of American influence, the fragmentation of allied cooperation, rising vulnerability in critical technologies and supply chains, and the strategic advantage ceded to integrated rivals such as China and Russia.
The stakes are real: the international order has already been altered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s economic and strategic assertiveness. Whether the United States chooses cooperative leadership or short-term extraction will shape global stability and American power for years to come.
Originally published at The Atlantic.