Is Gen Z Really 'Utterly Screwed'? The Data, the Fears, and the Reality

Is Gen Z Really 'Utterly Screwed'?

Short answer: The picture is mixed. By many objective measures, Generation Z is not uniformly worse off than previous generations were at the same age — but serious and concentrated risks, rising pessimism, and social trends are reshaping how young people experience their economic lives.

What the data shows

Multiple large datasets indicate that many young Americans today have higher incomes and — for some cohorts — more wealth than their counterparts in earlier generations. For example, a U.S. Federal Reserve analysis found the median 25‑year‑old earned over $40,000 in 2022 (after inflation, taxes and transfers), roughly 50% more than the typical boomer at the same age. As of 2023, people born between 1990 and 1999 had a median net worth about 39% higher, inflation‑adjusted, than previous cohorts at the same stage. The median wealth of Americans under 35 in 2022 was also the highest on record, and youth unemployment (ages 16–27) recently reached lows not seen in decades.

Real and concentrated challenges

That aggregate picture masks sharp problems. The U.S. faces a deep housing shortage: nationwide, about 58.6% of Gen Z adults were rent‑burdened in 2022, and housing costs in high‑opportunity cities such as New York and San Francisco make homeownership especially difficult without family support. Tuition has risen substantially — inflation‑adjusted college costs are more than double what boomers paid — producing large student‑loan balances for many graduates. These pressures are real and politically salient, and public policy could reduce them.

Why perceptions are so negative

Surveys show Gen Z expresses more economic pessimism than older cohorts did at the same age. Several forces help explain that gap:

• Relative comparisons: Young people naturally compare themselves to older adults who today hold higher incomes and more assets.
• Uncertainty about the future: Many in Gen Z are early in their careers, so long‑run risks — particularly automation and artificial intelligence — loom large.
• Media and social media: Expanded peer sets, curated influencer lifestyles, and negativity bias on social platforms amplify upward comparisons and make threats feel immediate. Research links heavy social‑media use to lower subjective well‑being among teens, in part by creating impressions that others are better off.
• Social isolation: Compared with earlier cohorts, Gen Z reports less socializing, lower rates of cohabitation and sex, and higher loneliness — all of which can worsen outlooks across life domains.

AI, jobs and the ladder effect

Artificial intelligence already performs tasks commonly done by junior white‑collar staff — drafting briefs, summarizing documents, preparing spreadsheets — and some employers have slowed hiring for entry‑level roles in AI‑exposed fields. Since the rollout of tools like ChatGPT, the share of recent grads without jobs has inched up, though higher interest rates likely played a role too. If automation reduces the number of entry rungs on career ladders, it could hamper the ability of newer cohorts to gain experience and advance, even while incumbents benefit.

Politics, extremism and anecdote

High anxiety can create fertile ground for political grievance in some corners. A recent anecdote reported by a conservative commentator suggested a sizeable minority of young Republican staffers expressed sympathy for an extremist influencer. While economic strain and alarm about the future might contribute to fringe political attraction for some individuals, such phenomena are complex and cannot be reduced to economics alone.

Conclusion

By many objective measures, Gen Z is not uniformly worse off than earlier generations were at the same age: incomes and some measures of wealth are higher, and youth unemployment has been low. Yet concentrated burdens (housing, tuition, student debt), plausible risks from automation, and the psychological effects of social media and loneliness produce widespread pessimism and political risk. Addressing the generation’s real structural problems — and the social conditions that magnify them — will require policy action and attention to mental‑health and community‑building as much as to macroeconomic statistics.