Washington’s Venezuela Dilemma: Why the 1989 Panama Invasion Is an Imperfect Blueprint

When history is used as a template

A Latin American strongman accused of enabling drug trafficking and manipulating elections openly defies the White House, prompting renewed debate in Washington about possible military measures. In 1989, Panama’s military ruler Manuel Noriega occupied a similar place in U.S. policy thinking: accused of taking millions to allow drug cartels to operate, he became public enemy number one and a target for U.S. action.

Operation Just Cause: a quick recap

The U.S. operation that ousted Noriega — codenamed Operation Just Cause — deployed more than 20,000 U.S. troops and culminated in Noriega’s surrender to U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents on January 3, 1990. His 1991 trial resulted in convictions on eight counts and a 40-year sentence. For some advocates of force against Nicolás Maduro, that intervention is sometimes cited as a rough model for confronting Venezuela, even if the parallels are limited.

Similarities — and why they matter

Both Noriega and Maduro have been accused by U.S. authorities of facilitating drug trafficking. Both leaders have also resisted external pressure and faced internal repression. Those surface similarities help explain why some policymakers invoke Panama when discussing Venezuela.

Key differences that complicate any comparison

However, there are important practical and political differences that make a Panama-style intervention far more complex in Venezuela:

• Scale and terrain: Panama in 1989 had roughly 2.5 million people; Venezuela today has over 28 million. Venezuela’s territory is more than ten times larger and includes dense jungles and sprawling urban slums that provide significant operational challenges.
• Geographic advantages then vs now: Panama then hosted U.S. military facilities that eased logistics and staging; no comparable network of permissive bases exists around Venezuela today.
• Inner-circle resistance: Many figures close to Maduro face U.S. indictments or carry large rewards for capture, reducing the likelihood of a negotiated exit and increasing the chance of violent resistance.
• Nonstate armed actors: Armed gangs operate in areas the Venezuelan military often avoids, complicating stabilization and post-conflict security operations.

“The question of Venezuelan military capability is not a serious one,” said Frank Mora, former U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States. “It’s not one that could sustain a U.S. invasion, but my concern has always been, it’s not just the time that it requires to bring down the regime, it’s the day after, and how do you maintain order in a country that has essentially collapsed?”

Political and regional constraints

Beyond military considerations, regional politics matter. Several Latin American governments have signaled they would not support or host U.S. forces for an operation against Venezuela. Panama’s president, José Raúl Mulino, who opposed the Noriega dictatorship before the 1989 invasion, said his country would not lend territory for any hostile act against Venezuela.

Bottom line

Invoking Panama highlights that the United States has previously used force to remove a leader accused of drug trafficking and repression. But the differences in scale, geography, political context and post-conflict risks make the Panama operation an imperfect and incomplete blueprint for Venezuela. Any consideration of military options would need to weigh not only how to remove a regime but how to secure and stabilize a far larger, more fractured country in the aftermath.

Reporting note: This piece draws on contemporary reporting and expert commentary; additional regional reporting contributed by Elizabeth González.