IAEA reports it cannot verify Iran’s near‑weapons‑grade uranium since June strikes. The agency says it has "lost continuity of knowledge" about inventories at sites hit during a 12‑day conflict and that five months without access makes verification overdue. Iran reported holding 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60% in September — an amount the IAEA says could yield material for up to 10 weapons if weaponized. Tehran says further cooperation depends on its Supreme National Security Council after renewed U.N. sanctions.
IAEA Says It Hasn't Verified Iran’s Near‑Weapons‑Grade Uranium Since June Strikes
IAEA reports it cannot verify Iran’s near‑weapons‑grade uranium since June strikes. The agency says it has "lost continuity of knowledge" about inventories at sites hit during a 12‑day conflict and that five months without access makes verification overdue. Iran reported holding 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60% in September — an amount the IAEA says could yield material for up to 10 weapons if weaponized. Tehran says further cooperation depends on its Supreme National Security Council after renewed U.N. sanctions.

IAEA Unable to Verify Iran’s Near‑Weapons‑Grade Uranium After June Strikes
VIENNA — The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) says it has been unable to confirm the status or location of Iran’s stockpile of near‑weapons‑grade uranium since Israeli and U.S. strikes hit Iranian nuclear sites during a 12‑day conflict in June, according to a confidential IAEA report circulated to member states and reviewed by The Associated Press.
The agency warned it has "lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the previously declared inventories of nuclear material in Iran" at facilities affected by the fighting and said this gap must be "urgently addressed." The report noted that five months without access means routine verification under standard safeguards practice is overdue.
How much material is at issue?
In its most recent public update in September, the IAEA reported Iran held 440.9 kilograms (972 pounds) of uranium enriched to 60% purity — a technical step short of the roughly 90% enrichment generally considered weapons‑grade. The agency has said that amount of 60% uranium could, if weaponized, provide enough fissile material for as many as 10 nuclear weapons, though Director General Rafael Grossi has stressed that the figure does not mean Iran currently possesses nuclear weapons.
Reporting and access obligations
Under Iran’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA, Tehran is required to submit a "special report" when events such as attacks or earthquakes affect safeguarded nuclear material. That report must detail the location and status of nuclear material — including highly enriched uranium — and explain the condition of facilities struck during the June fighting. The IAEA called such a report "indispensable" for the agency to provide assurances that safeguarded material remains in peaceful activities and that facilities are not being misused.
The confidential report records that in a Nov. 11 letter Iran told the IAEA any cooperation would be conditional on a decision by the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). The IAEA also reported that Tehran has not granted inspectors access to sites damaged in the conflict.
Inspections at some undamaged sites
Earlier, after IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi met Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Cairo in early September, Iran allowed inspections at several undamaged facilities, including the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, the Tehran Research Reactor and three other sites in Tehran. The agency said inspectors were travelling to the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center to conduct further checks. Isfahan, roughly 350 kilometers (215 miles) southeast of Tehran, hosts research reactors and laboratories linked to Iran’s atomic program.
During the June fighting, Israeli strikes hit buildings at the Isfahan complex, including a uranium conversion facility; U.S. missiles also targeted installations in the area, the report said.
Sanctions, suspension of cooperation and next steps
Iran suspended all cooperation with the IAEA after the war. Grossi’s early‑September agreement with Araghchi had been intended to restore inspections, but Tehran later halted implementation after the U.N. reimposed sanctions using the so‑called "snapback" mechanism. European states supported the renewed measures after Tehran failed to resume full cooperation with the IAEA, return to direct talks with the United States, and clarify the status of its near‑weapons‑grade uranium stockpile.
The sanctions freeze Iranian assets abroad, curb arms deals with Tehran and impose penalties related to its ballistic missile program, increasing the diplomatic and economic pressure on the country.
"Resolving the access and reporting issues is urgent so the agency can determine whether safeguarded nuclear material remains in peaceful activities and whether affected facilities are being misused," the IAEA said in the report.
Note: The Associated Press receives support for nuclear security coverage from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Outrider Foundation; the AP is solely responsible for this content.
