From Firebrand to KMT Chair: Cheng Li-wun’s Rise and What It Means for Taiwan

From Student Protester To Kuomintang Leader

In the late 1980s Taiwan was convulsed by political change. Martial law—imposed during Chiang Kai-shek’s White Terror—had only recently been lifted, and a new generation of protesters filled the streets demanding democratic reform. Cheng Li-wun was among those activists, delivering fiery speeches denouncing the island’s then-rulers as "despicable" and accusing them of trying to "squeeze and oppress the Taiwanese people."

At that time I was Reuters bureau chief in Taipei and interviewed many students who railed against the Kuomintang (KMT) with similar intensity. They often viewed the party as a Chinese occupying force and sought a distinct Taiwanese identity; some openly advocated independence.

A Remarkable Transformation

Today Taiwan is a vibrant democracy—with an outspoken media, energetic parliamentary debates and a strong sense of its own history and culture. Cheng herself has undergone a notable transformation. Now a Cambridge-educated lawyer, legislator and media personality, she is the newly elected chair of the Kuomintang.

Cheng won the party leadership in October on a platform that leaned toward closer ties with Beijing. She urged Taiwanese to "be proud to be Chinese," promoted reconciliation with the mainland and paid respects at Chiang Kai-shek’s tomb—moves that unsettled some longstanding KMT members. One senior member joked the party should rename itself the "Chinese Nationalist Surrender Party," while others raised concerns about outside interference from Beijing.

"Could it be that the United States is treating Taiwan as a chess piece, a pawn to strategically provoke the Chinese Communist Party?"
— Cheng Li-wun, quoted in The New York Times

Why Her Rise Matters

Cheng’s ascent reflects deeper currents within Taiwan’s politics. She defeated a crowded field by appealing to rank-and-file members worried that President Lai Ching-te’s handling of the independence question could provoke a military response from Beijing. Some KMT supporters fear that another DPP presidential victory in 2028 might convince Beijing that force is the only way to change the status quo.

I covered the 2016 election that brought Tsai Ing-wen to power; that campaign drew energy from the Sunflower Movement, a youth-led revolt against closer economic integration with China. Back then the island’s mood was defiantly resistant to mainland pressure. Today, however, the environment is more fraught.

Pressure From Beijing And Waning Confidence In Washington

Beijing has frozen Tsai and branded Lai a "dangerous separatist" while stepping up military and diplomatic pressure—sending fighter jets into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone, conducting naval drills and rehearsing amphibious operations. Analysts say these moves are designed to exert psychological pressure and compel Taiwan to yield without open conflict.

At the same time, skepticism about U.S. reliability has grown among Taiwanese. Polls show rising doubts that Washington would intervene militarily in a crisis. Tensions with the United States have been exacerbated by moves during the Trump administration—such as proposals to relocate semiconductor capacity and talk of tariffs—that fed concerns about American commitment and strategic motives.

Political And Strategic Implications

It is unclear whether Cheng has presidential ambitions or whether she can reconcile the KMT’s factions and win over swing voters, most of whom identify primarily as Taiwanese. Opinion polls indicate only a small share—roughly 3%—say they are purely Chinese. Most Taiwanese favour preserving the status quo to avoid triggering a likely Chinese response.

Nevertheless, Beijing appears to be courting Cheng: Chinese leader Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory message after her victory, and a meeting between them has been discussed. That closeness alarms Washington because a KMT-led coalition now controls the legislature, potentially complicating President Lai’s efforts to pass a proposed $40 billion special defence budget the U.S. supports.

Cheng has expressed skepticism about close coordination with the United States and about treating Taiwan as a pawn in great-power rivalry—positions that will shape Taipei’s domestic debate and cross-strait policy in the months ahead.

What To Watch Next

• Whether Cheng seeks the presidency and can broaden her appeal beyond the KMT base;
• How Beijing balances engagement with military pressure if it views Taiwan’s politics as shifting in its favour;
• Whether declining public confidence in U.S. support changes Taiwan’s defence planning and regional alignments.