Key point: Despite warm public exchanges and the "major non‑NATO ally" designation, the United States and Saudi Arabia are not formal allies because they lack a mutual-defense treaty. The designation offers practical benefits like faster procurement and better access to defense financing, but it does not create binding security guarantees. Longstanding cooperation coexists with major differences — from the Yemen war and the 2017 Qatar blockade to the Khashoggi killing and lingering 9/11 litigation — underscoring the limits of the partnership.
Why the U.S. and Saudi Arabia Are Not True Allies — Despite Trump and MBS
Key point: Despite warm public exchanges and the "major non‑NATO ally" designation, the United States and Saudi Arabia are not formal allies because they lack a mutual-defense treaty. The designation offers practical benefits like faster procurement and better access to defense financing, but it does not create binding security guarantees. Longstanding cooperation coexists with major differences — from the Yemen war and the 2017 Qatar blockade to the Khashoggi killing and lingering 9/11 litigation — underscoring the limits of the partnership.
08:22 PM, 11/19/2025Politics
President Donald Trump’s lavish reception for Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman showcased a close personal rapport and dramatic headlines: public praise, promises of large Saudi investments, and the designation of Saudi Arabia as a "major non‑NATO ally." But labels and photo ops do not equate to a formal alliance.
The United States and Saudi Arabia maintain a long-standing security relationship that stretches back to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1945 meeting with King Abdul Aziz aboard the U.S.S. Quincy. Yet friendship, arms sales and intelligence cooperation differ fundamentally from a treaty-based alliance. In international law and under U.S. statutes an "ally" typically implies a mutual-defense commitment — a formal obligation that both partners will come to one another’s defense in wartime. No such treaty exists between Washington and Riyadh.
What the "major non‑NATO ally" status actually means
The recent designation as a major non‑NATO ally confers practical benefits: easier access to certain U.S. defense financing, streamlined procurement, and potentially faster deliveries of equipment. It does not, however, create automatic security guarantees or a legal obligation for the United States to defend Saudi Arabia in a conflict. In short, it is largely a procedural and symbolic upgrade rather than a binding alliance commitment.
Historical context and past policy statements
There have been moments when U.S. leaders framed Gulf security as vital to American interests. Most notably, President Jimmy Carter’s 1980 State of the Union warned that attempts by outside powers to control the Persian Gulf would be treated as assaults on U.S. interests. That statement reflected Cold War-era calculations about the Soviet threat; it does not amount to a modern, mutual-defense treaty and the strategic environment has changed substantially since then.
Shared interests — but also sharp differences
Washington and Riyadh often find common ground on short- and medium-term goals: limiting Iranian regional influence, stabilizing energy markets, countering terrorism, and managing crises such as the recent outbreaks of violence in the region. U.S. and Saudi intelligence services regularly cooperate on counterterrorism and security matters.
Yet these convergences are pragmatic and situational rather than rooted in shared values or binding commitments. High-profile episodes underscore the divergence: the 2015 Saudi-led campaign in Yemen devastated infrastructure and triggered deeper Iranian backing for the Houthis; the 2017 blockade of Qatar, driven by Riyadh’s displeasure with Doha’s foreign policy, produced unintended regional consequences; and the 2018 murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul revealed deep differences in norms and governance that are difficult to reconcile with close partnership rhetoric.
Complicating matters further, the long shadow of the September 11 attacks — 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals — and multi-year litigation alleging links between Saudi actors and the attacks have strained public opinion and political trust in the United States.
Why the distinction matters
Calling Saudi Arabia an "ally" in the formal sense implies legal obligations and mutual defense commitments that the United States has not made. That distinction is important for policymakers and the public: it clarifies what Washington is—and is not—prepared to do in the event of future crises. For Americans evaluating foreign policy choices, recognizing the limits of the relationship helps ensure realistic expectations and better alignment between rhetoric, policy tools, and national interests.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the U.S.-Saudi relationship is best described as a strategic partnership marked by extensive security cooperation, shared interests at times, and significant differences in priorities and values. Symbolic gestures and elevated status do not transform that partnership into a treaty-bound alliance. Policymakers should therefore treat such declarations with caution and base decisions on the concrete realities and limits of the relationship.