Could the RSF Turn el‑Obeid into a Second el‑Fasher? Siege Fears Rise After Bara and el‑Fasher

On the morning of 25 October, Rapid Support Forces (RSF) fighters swept into the town of Bara in North Kordofan, prompting traumatic scenes and a mass displacement toward el‑Obeid. Sadiq Ahmed, a 59‑year‑old resident, feared for his two daughters when fighters began raiding homes for loot — and reportedly for women and girls.

“It was a red line for me. I was prepared to die to protect my daughters,” Sadiq told Al Jazeera after handing over cash, phones and gold but refusing to surrender his family members.

United Nations and Human Rights Watch reports say the RSF has routinely used rape as a weapon of war and abducted women and girls. Between 26 October and 9 November, roughly 39,000 people were displaced across parts of Kordofan, according to the UN. Local groups such as Sudan’s Doctor’s Network reported at least 38 civilian deaths during the RSF’s seizure of Bara, and local monitors reported executions of men accused of "sympathising" with the army.

Why el‑Obeid matters

El‑Obeid, about 59 km (36 miles) east of Bara, remains controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Analysts describe the city as strategic: it hosts a SAF airbase and serves as an important buffer for Khartoum. Since the fighting began in April 2023, el‑Obeid has taken in tens of thousands of displaced people seeking relative safety — but relief workers and analysts warn the city may not remain secure.

RSF redeployment and the threat posture

A leaked RSF document, reported by Darfur24, and local reporting indicate the RSF is redeploying thousands of fighters to North Kordofan after capturing el‑Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. Observers say the RSF — largely composed of nomadic Arab fighters in this context — besieged el‑Fasher for more than 500 days before conducting widespread violence against sedentary non‑Arab communities.

Humanitarian analysts fear a repeat of atrocities in el‑Obeid. Nathaniel Raymond, executive director of the Yale Humanitarian Lab, warned that the RSF could put el‑Obeid under siege by late November and is likely trying to seize Babanusa in West Kordofan as a staging point for a full assault. The RSF has used drones launched from el‑Fasher’s airport to strain SAF defenses and may replicate that tactic around Babanusa.

SAF response and constraints

The SAF has accelerated recruitment, training and deployment of newly mobilised civilians (the "mustanfereen") and opened a training camp in North Kordofan. Fighters from SAF‑aligned groups, the Joint Forces that defended el‑Fasher for many months, are also present in el‑Obeid. Yet locals report curfews by fear — few civilians leave homes after dark — and some are fleeing further north toward White Nile state.

Despite reinforcements, analysts say SAF faces serious constraints. Historically dependent on close air support, the SAF has been challenged by the RSF’s acquisition of man‑portable air‑defence systems (MANPADS), in use since at least 2024, which threaten low‑flying aircraft. That development has eroded SAF’s air supremacy and complicated its ability to project power across the vast region.

Regional dynamics and outlook

Regional backers such as Turkey and Egypt could supply arms — Turkey is reported to have supplied Bayraktar drones to the SAF — and Egypt has been asked for access to air‑defence systems, though it remains cautious about direct involvement. Experts caution that additional weapons alone are unlikely to be decisive: manpower shortages and the vast terrain limit SAF’s ability to hold territory even with new equipment.

What’s at stake: el‑Obeid’s fall would deepen humanitarian displacement, risk further atrocities against civilians, and shift frontlines closer to Khartoum. For now, the city remains under SAF control, but the coming weeks will be critical as both sides reposition and civilians weigh whether to stay or flee.