Key points: The USS Gerald R. Ford and a large U.S. task force in the Caribbean underscore a major power imbalance with Venezuela. The FANB fields Soviet‑era systems — Su‑30 fighters, T‑72 tanks and S‑300 air defenses — but years of economic crisis, sanctions and emigration have undermined maintenance and readiness. Venezuela’s opaque Bolivarian Militia is unlikely to be a decisive conventional force and may be better suited to local intelligence and internal security roles.
Venezuela vs. the U.S. in the Caribbean: How Caracas’ Soviet‑Era Military Really Stacks Up
Key points: The USS Gerald R. Ford and a large U.S. task force in the Caribbean underscore a major power imbalance with Venezuela. The FANB fields Soviet‑era systems — Su‑30 fighters, T‑72 tanks and S‑300 air defenses — but years of economic crisis, sanctions and emigration have undermined maintenance and readiness. Venezuela’s opaque Bolivarian Militia is unlikely to be a decisive conventional force and may be better suited to local intelligence and internal security roles.
12:35 PM, 11/14/2025Security
Overview
The arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford and a large U.S. naval formation in the Caribbean has renewed debate over whether Washington and Caracas are preparing for a broader confrontation. U.S. officials say the deployment is focused on counter‑drug operations, but the scale of the force — a carrier strike group, roughly 15,000 personnel, more than a dozen warships and F‑35 fighters staged to Puerto Rico — highlights a stark disparity with Venezuela’s aging, largely Soviet‑era military.
U.S. buildup in the region
The United States has positioned a carrier strike group around the USS Gerald R. Ford supported by cruisers, destroyers, an air‑and‑missile‑defense command ship, amphibious assault vessels and at least one attack submarine. About 10 F‑35 jets were flown to Puerto Rico, which is serving as a staging hub for operations in the Caribbean. Observers note this is the largest U.S. presence in the region since the 1989 Panama operation.
What Venezuela can field
Over the past two decades Venezuela’s Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) built an image as one of Latin America’s better‑equipped militaries by buying Russian systems during the presidencies of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro. On paper, the inventory includes Su‑30 fighters, T‑72 tanks, S‑300 long‑range air defenses, Pechora and Buk medium‑range systems, portable Igla‑S launchers and large numbers of small arms.
Operational readiness: the real constraint
The primary limitation is not the list of systems but their operational availability. More than a decade of economic collapse, hyperinflation, declining oil revenues and international sanctions have strained maintenance budgets, spare parts supply chains and training cycles. About 7.9 million Venezuelans have emigrated in recent years, many of them young adults of military age, further reducing the pool of available personnel.
Manpower and command
- Active personnel: approximately 123,000 (Army 63,000; Navy 25,500; Air Force 11,500; National Guard 23,000), plus about 8,000 reservists (IISS).
- Command: the operational strategic commander is Domingo Antonio Hernández Lárez; his brother Maj. Gen. Johan Alexander Hernández Lárez heads the army.
- Officer corps: promotions tied to political loyalty have produced an unusually large number of senior officers relative to force size.
Army and ground forces
The army is the largest element and most politically integrated branch. Key ground systems include around 92 T‑72B1 tanks, 123 BMP‑3 infantry fighting vehicles, and 81 AMX‑30 tanks acquired earlier from France, along with Msta‑S self‑propelled howitzers and Smerch multiple‑rocket launchers. However, spare parts shortages and limited maintenance reduce operational availability.
Air force
Venezuela’s air arm, the Bolivarian Military Aviation, is small but distinguished by its Su‑30MK2 fighters. These twin‑engine jets remain more capable than those of many regional air forces; Venezuela reportedly had up to 24 Su‑30s though a number have been lost in accidents. The air fleet also includes a few older U.S. F‑16s purchased before the Chávez era. Air defenses comprise S‑300 long‑range batteries, Buk and Pechora medium‑range systems, and numerous Igla‑S portable launchers, which analysts say would likely be early targets in any conflict aimed at neutralizing Venezuelan air defenses.
Navy
The Bolivarian Navy focuses on Caribbean operations but has seen fewer recent acquisitions. Its oceanic fleet includes one Mariscal Sucre‑class frigate and a single Type‑209 submarine, supported by coastal and ocean patrol vessels. Some vessels were not originally fitted with full weapon suites and remain comparatively lightly armed versus modern naval opponents.
Bolivarian Militia
Formed as a civilian reserve and loyalist force, the Bolivarian Militia’s size is highly disputed. Independent estimates before the recent U.S. deployment placed the force around 220,000; President Maduro has claimed figures ranging from 4.5 million to 8.2 million, numbers analysts view as inflated. Most publicly displayed militia units lack professional training and would likely be limited to local defense, intelligence collection and internal security roles rather than effective conventional battlefield performance.
Assessment and implications
On paper, Venezuela retains some advanced platforms that distinguish it from many neighbors. In practice, years of underinvestment, spare‑parts shortages and emigration have degraded readiness and availability. Against a concentrated, modern U.S. force centered on a carrier strike group and fifth‑generation fighters, Venezuela’s capabilities present a significant asymmetry—capable of symbolic deterrence and localized defense actions, but limited in sustained conventional combat at scale.
Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), defense analysts at CRIES, public statements by Venezuelan officials and independent watchdogs.