The Shenzhou‑20 spacecraft was struck by orbital debris in early November 2025, delaying its return and temporarily leaving three taikonauts aboard Tiangong. Even tiny fragments travelling about 18,000 mph can destroy spacecraft and create more hazardous debris, threatening vital orbits. China — linked to the large 2007 Fengyun‑1C ASAT test — now has more to lose as its space capabilities grow, creating mutual vulnerability with other space actors. The incident could prompt pragmatic US–China cooperation on collision warnings, safer operations and debris removal.
Shenzhou‑20 Struck by Space Debris — A Wake‑Up Call and Opportunity for US–China Cooperation
The Shenzhou‑20 spacecraft was struck by orbital debris in early November 2025, delaying its return and temporarily leaving three taikonauts aboard Tiangong. Even tiny fragments travelling about 18,000 mph can destroy spacecraft and create more hazardous debris, threatening vital orbits. China — linked to the large 2007 Fengyun‑1C ASAT test — now has more to lose as its space capabilities grow, creating mutual vulnerability with other space actors. The incident could prompt pragmatic US–China cooperation on collision warnings, safer operations and debris removal.

In early November 2025, China’s Shenzhou‑20 spacecraft was struck by a piece of orbital debris, forcing officials to postpone the vehicle’s return from the Tiangong space station and temporarily leaving three crew members — commonly called taikonauts — onboard. The incident highlights the growing danger from human‑made debris in low Earth orbit and underscores the urgent need for better international coordination.
What happened and why it matters
Space debris includes any artificial objects in orbit that no longer serve a functional purpose: everything from paint flakes to spent rocket stages. In low Earth orbit (LEO), these objects travel at roughly 18,000 mph — nearly seven times the speed of a bullet — so even millimeter‑scale fragments can disable spacecraft. When objects collide and fragment, they produce many more hazardous pieces, increasing the likelihood that some orbits could become unusable.
Historical context
There is a stark irony to the Shenzhou‑20 impact: China is associated with one of the largest single debris‑creating events in history. In 2007, a Chinese anti‑satellite (ASAT) test destroyed the Fengyun‑1C weather satellite and produced more than 3,000 catalogued fragments that remain in orbit. Debris from that event has forced maneuvering by other crewed vehicles, including the International Space Station (ISS), as recently as 2021.
Why states build anti‑satellite capabilities
Satellites provide critical military and civilian services — reconnaissance, communications, navigation and weather data — all of which became decisive in modern conflicts such as the 1991 Gulf War. Historically, China relied less on space assets than the United States, which reduced the immediate cost of striking or disabling an adversary’s satellites. Since the 1990s, Beijing invested in counterspace technologies to offset U.S. advantages.
Changing incentives
China’s space capabilities have grown substantially; it is now one of the most capable spacefaring nations. That progress means China has more to lose from debris and disruption. Recent close calls have illustrated this shift: debris from Russia’s 2021 ASAT test reportedly came near a Chinese satellite in 2022, China reported “close encounters” between Tiangong and Starlink satellites in 2021, and now Shenzhou‑20 has actually been struck.
Practical avenues for cooperation
The Shenzhou‑20 incident creates an area of shared vulnerability where Washington and Beijing could realistically cooperate, even amid broader strategic competition. Practical confidence‑building and risk‑reduction measures include:
- Timely reciprocal notifications of collision risks (conjunction warnings).
- Agreed best practices for safe satellite operations and responsible constellation deployment.
- Joint research, norms development and cooperative programs for active debris removal and improved space traffic management.
What’s at stake
Tiangong is a high‑visibility symbol of China’s space program and represents decades of investment. If the ISS is deorbited around 2030 as planned, Tiangong could become the only crewed station in LEO, increasing its symbolic and practical importance. Beyond national prestige, crew safety and the continued operation of critical satellites — for weather forecasting, communications, navigation and scientific research — are direct, tangible stakes for many countries.
Conclusion: The threat from space debris is not going away. As megaconstellations and more national programs increase the population of LEO, the incentives for pragmatic, technical cooperation — including between strategic competitors — will grow. The Shenzhou‑20 incident may help prompt that necessary dialogue.
Originally published by The Conversation. Author: R. Lincoln Hines, Georgia Institute of Technology.
