Researchers Claim a Gödel-Based Argument: The Universe Cannot Be a Computer Simulation

Researchers claim mathematical argument against the simulation hypothesis

The idea that we might be living inside a computer simulation — popularized by films such as The Matrix and discussed widely since Nick Bostrom's influential 2003 paper — has intrigued scientists, philosophers and the public for decades. Bostrom argued that if sufficiently advanced civilizations can create simulated universes, the number of simulated observers could vastly outnumber those in any putative original reality.

In a recent paper published in the Journal of Holography Applications in Physics, adjunct professor Mir Faizal of the University of British Columbia Okanagan and collaborators argue that this scenario is mathematically impossible. Drawing on results from mathematical logic, notably Gödel's incompleteness theorems, the authors contend that some truths about reality are inherently "non-algorithmic" — not capturable by any finite, rule-based computation — and therefore cannot be reproduced by a simulation.

"We have demonstrated that it is impossible to describe all aspects of physical reality using a computational theory of quantum gravity," Faizal is quoted as saying. "Therefore, no physically complete and consistent theory of everything can be derived from computation alone."

Coauthor Lawrence Krauss adds that the fundamental laws that generate space and time cannot themselves be fully contained within a computational description. The paper argues that a truly complete description of the so-called Platonic realm of abstract information requires a form of understanding that transcends algorithmic procedures.

What the claim means — and what it doesn't

The authors' central claim is philosophical as well as mathematical: if Gödel-style limits on formal systems apply to any computational model of physics, then no purely algorithmic simulation can reproduce every true feature of reality. In short, they argue, a simulation — by definition algorithmic — could not capture certain non-algorithmic aspects of existence.

However, this conclusion is controversial. Gödel's theorems apply to formal mathematical systems, and experts continue to debate how and whether those limits transfer directly to physical theories or to hypothetical simulations. The paper has sparked discussion among physicists and philosophers about the scope and interpretation of mathematical incompleteness when applied to fundamental physics.

Implications and next steps

If the argument holds, it would challenge efforts to reduce all physical phenomena to a single computational "theory of everything," and it would cast doubt on the simulation hypothesis as commonly formulated. But confirming such a broad claim requires further scrutiny, critique, and dialogue across disciplines — including mathematics, physics, computer science and philosophy.

Whether one views the paper as a decisive refutation of simulations or as a provocative contribution to an ongoing debate, it highlights deep questions at the intersection of computation, logic and the foundations of reality.