CRBC News

Russia Attaches Turbojet Engines to Soviet KAB Glide Bombs, Extending Range to ~125 Miles

Key points: Russia is reportedly fitting Soviet-era KAB glide bombs with small Chinese turbojet engines, extending their range from roughly 50 miles to about 125 miles (200 km). Debris recovered in Poltava allegedly included a Swiwin SW800Pro-Y engine sold online for about $18,000. Ukrainian officials say the modification expands the potential strike zone and increases strain on Ukraine's air-defence network, though independent verification is limited and mass production has not been confirmed.

Russia Attaches Turbojet Engines to Soviet KAB Glide Bombs, Extending Range to ~125 Miles

Russia retrofits Soviet-era KAB glide bombs with small turbojet engines

Russian forces have reportedly begun fitting Soviet-designed KAB guided glide bombs with small turbojet engines, a modification Ukrainian officials say substantially increases the weapons' range and complicates air-defence planning. Images circulated by Ukrainian sources show wreckage that investigators say includes a Chinese-made Swiwin SW800Pro-Y turbojet; the model is sold on commercial marketplaces for roughly $18,000.

What changed

Traditionally, KAB-series bombs fitted with wings and GPS guidance kits could travel roughly 50 miles (about 80 km) when released from stand-off points near the front. Major General Vadym Skibitsky, deputy head of Ukraine's GRU military intelligence, has stated the retrofitted versions can reach about 125 miles (≈200 km), allowing Russian aircraft to release them from greater distance.

Evidence and verification

Published images of wreckage in Poltava and reports of a strike on the rail hub of Lozova in Kharkiv region — said to have travelled some 85 miles — underpin the claims. These images and accounts have not been fully independently verified. Russian media have acknowledged testing of a system called the "UMPK," and Ukrainian officials say the altered munitions began appearing in September.

Technological notes

Investigators also report the modified KABs have been recovered with upgraded control modules, which Ukrainian sources say are designed to increase resistance to electronic-warfare jamming. The use of off-the-shelf turbojet units and commercial components would make these kits relatively inexpensive compared with purpose-built cruise missiles.

"The main consequences for Ukraine can be summarised as follows: an expansion of the potential strike zone and an additional burden on Ukrainian air defence forces," said Serhii Kuzan, chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Centre.

Operational and strategic implications

  • Expanded risk area: Ukrainian analysts say many cities and infrastructure up to about 200 km (125 miles) from the front — including parts of Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv and Odesa regions — could now be exposed to guided aerial strikes.
  • Defence strain: Kyiv has concentrated surface-to-air assets around key infrastructure, limiting protection elsewhere and stretching intercept capacity.
  • Cost asymmetry: Ukraine has reportedly intercepted some of these weapons at a reasonable rate, but using expensive Western interceptors (for example, a Patriot PAC-3 interceptor can cost around $1 million each) against cheaply improvised glide bombs raises difficult economic choices.

Context and caveats

Ukrainian officials say Russia began modifying KAB bombs in 2023 amid shortages of cruise missiles and to allow jets to launch from safer distances. Kyiv estimates that roughly 40,000 guided KAB-type munitions have been used in the conflict since their adoption, though such figures are difficult to verify independently.

Analysts describe the turbojet retrofit as an evolutionary adaptation rather than a transformative technological leap: it increases the geographic reach of strikes and raises the burden on Ukraine's air-defence network, but does not fundamentally change the nature of the conflict. Ukrainian intelligence assessments indicate Russia is still some distance from mass-producing the modified, jet-propelled bombs; current use appears to include testing and occasional operational strikes to assess effectiveness and Ukrainian reactions.

Note: Many details remain unconfirmed and are based on Ukrainian official statements and images circulated online. Independent verification is limited, and assessments may evolve as more information becomes available.