Key points: Since a ceasefire was declared, Israel has continued strikes in Lebanon and Gaza — a pattern analysts call "Lebanonisation," meaning formal cessation of war but ongoing attacks. Reported post‑ceasefire Gaza casualties include at least 236 killed and roughly 600 wounded, while the October 7, 2023 attacks on Israel killed 1,139 and took over 200 captive. Experts warn this "no war, no peace" dynamic hinders reconstruction, increases the risk of escalation and institutionalizes indefinite military pressure rather than a political resolution.
‘No War, No Peace’: How Israel Is 'Lebanonising' Gaza — Ceasefires, Cross‑Border Strikes and a New Normal
Key points: Since a ceasefire was declared, Israel has continued strikes in Lebanon and Gaza — a pattern analysts call "Lebanonisation," meaning formal cessation of war but ongoing attacks. Reported post‑ceasefire Gaza casualties include at least 236 killed and roughly 600 wounded, while the October 7, 2023 attacks on Israel killed 1,139 and took over 200 captive. Experts warn this "no war, no peace" dynamic hinders reconstruction, increases the risk of escalation and institutionalizes indefinite military pressure rather than a political resolution.

Overview
Since a formal ceasefire was announced, Israel has continued to carry out strikes across the region — including in Lebanon and Gaza — a pattern analysts describe as "Lebanonisation": ending declared open warfare while preserving the right to launch punitive or preventive attacks at will. These operations, critics say, create a persistent low‑level conflict that undermines reconstruction, raises the risk of wider escalation and entrenches a prolonged status quo of "no war, no peace."
Recent incidents and timeline
In the weeks after the ceasefire began on October 10, Israel conducted strikes both inside Gaza and beyond. Reported incidents include an air attack that killed four people in Lebanon on a recent Sunday, a separate strike that killed a man on a motorbike the previous Friday, and at least one death from Israeli airstrikes on October 17. In Gaza, analysts say Israeli operations since the ceasefire have killed at least 236 Palestinians and wounded roughly 600.
These post‑ceasefire operations mirror the pattern seen after the November 27, 2024 ceasefire with Hezbollah in Lebanon, where Israeli strikes continued periodically despite the formal agreement. Israel argues it retains the right to act until groups it deems hostile, such as Hezbollah, are disarmed. Critics argue this effectively allows indefinite, unilateral use of force.
Voices and analysis
Rob Geist Pinfold, international security scholar at King’s College London: “They [Israelis] don’t want to resolve the conflict. War is the new norm.”
Before October 7, 2023, Hamas and Hezbollah were broadly perceived as exerting a degree of deterrence over Israel. The October 7 attacks in Israel, which killed 1,139 people and resulted in the abduction of more than 200, precipitated major changes in Israeli strategy, according to commentators: instead of a brief campaign followed by a return to peacetime norms, Israel appears to be pursuing a posture of continual pressure.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has warned the Lebanese government that Israel may take further action unless Hezbollah is disarmed. His office said: “We will not allow Lebanon to become a renewed front against us, and we will act as necessary.” Those threats have stoked anxiety in southern Lebanon, where many residents say the ceasefire has never fully taken hold.
Comparisons with Lebanon and regional effects
Analysts say the dynamic in Lebanon — where periodic Israeli strikes have continued under a ceasefire — is being replicated in Gaza. Under this model, Israel defines what counts as a violation and retains freedom of action; any retaliatory strike by a militant group can be used as justification for escalatory responses.
Mustafa Barghouti, Palestinian National Initiative: “No full war but continuous Israeli military attacks, exactly like he is doing in Lebanon.”
Observers also point to broader patterns: Israeli strikes have been reported in the occupied West Bank, Syria and Yemen, and allegations have been raised about an attack in Tunisia. Only when an operation touched Qatar did the United States reportedly press Netanyahu to apologize, suggesting there are limits to unfettered action.
Costs, strategy and prospects
Scholars warn that this model is costly in political, humanitarian and strategic terms. Marc Lynch of George Washington University argues military primacy alone cannot produce stable regional leadership because it lacks the consent and cooperation of other states. For Gaza, leaving a deeper military footprint inside the Strip creates more opportunities for resistance and complicates reconstruction, producing a status quo that may be more tolerable for armed groups than for civilians or for Israel’s long‑term security.
As Rob Geist Pinfold summarizes: “This status quo is more bearable for Hamas than for Israel. The problem is that it is a direct impediment to reconstruction for the people of Gaza.”
Conclusion
The "Lebanonisation" label captures a shift toward protracted, intermittent use of force that blurs the line between war and peace. Unless political pathways to disarmament, accountability and reconstruction are pursued, the region risks remaining trapped in recurring cycles of violence with heavy costs for civilians and little sustainable security for any party.
